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International Legal Updates
North America & the Caribbean
The Situation of Women and Girls
in Haiti Exemplifies the Difficulties
of Post-Natural Disaster
Protection of Human Rights
Almost two years after a catastrophic
earthquake devastated Haiti, killing more
than 220,000 people and leaving more than
a million people displaced, over 600,000
people still remain in makeshift tent
cities, displaced within their own country.
Disasters such as this leave a population
vulnerable to disease and diminished personal security due to lack of infrastructure,
rule of law, and effective public works.
While deprivation of human rights may
unfortunately be inevitable in extreme
natural disasters, prevention of human
rights abuses post-disaster is essential to
protecting especially vulnerable groups.
In Haiti, it was the existing inadequate
human rights protections for women and
girls that aggravated their vulnerability
to increased sexual assault, gender based
violence, and sex in exchange for basic
needs post-earthquake. The grim situation
faced by women and girls in Haiti indicates
that where human rights protections are not
sufficient, natural disasters only intensify
existing abuses.
Before the earthquake, Haiti’s protection of women and girls was troubling.
The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights reported, “forms of discrimination
against women have been a fixture in the
history of Haiti, both in times of peace and
in times of unrest and violence.” Human
Rights Watch (HRW) reports that according
to the UN, between 2004 and 2006 up to
50 percent of girls living in conflict zones
in Port-au-Prince were victims of widespread or systematic rape, sexual violence,
or ‘gang’ rape. A survey of the area found
that an estimated 35,000 women and girls
were sexually assaulted between February
2004 and December 2006.
“Experience has also shown that preexisting vulnerabilities and patterns of
discrimination usually become exacerbated
in situations of natural disaster,” states
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s

(IASC) Operational Guidelines on the
Protection of Persons in Situations of
Natural Disasters. Though there is not yet
data available on the number of sexual
assaults post-earthquake, HRW predicts
the numbers have increased due to new
vulnerabilities. Other human rights organizations have found potential correlations between levels of hunger, survival
or transactional sex, and an increased risk
for gender-based violence. The recovery
efforts are failing to protect and provide
for women who are made more vulnerable
by life in the tent camps.
Despite the earthquake, Haiti’s human
rights obligations remain the same. Haiti
is a party to several international human
rights treaties that create binding obligations on the government to improve women’s health, including maternal and reproductive health, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
American Convention on Human Rights,
and the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence Against Women. Moreover,
the ratification of these international
instruments demonstrates the State’s ack
nowledgement of its responsibility to exercise due diligence and undertake state
actions to effectively address forms of discrimination and violence against women.
Where the Government made pre-earthquake efforts to meet these obligations,
it provided women some post-earthquake
protection. The Ministry of Women created
a five-year plan to improve the lives of
women and girls throughout Haiti. The
Ministry partnered with women’s NGOs,
and UN Agencies to create the Concernation
Nationale Contre Les Violence Faites Aux
Femmes (Concertation Nationale). While
the earthquake greatly affected these
efforts, the Concertation Nationale created some effective plans and legislation
that aim to improve conditions for women.
The Concertation Nationale helped to pass
the 2005 decree making rape a crime and
establishing a policy that all victims of
sexual aggression can receive medical
certification of sexual violence in order
to ensure that evidence is present for the
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prosecution of perpetrators. The organization continues to push for the passage
of anti-violence legislation that penalizes
assailants, as well as public safety officials
who do not enforce the law.
Despite the advancements, Haiti’s
preventative and responsive efforts are
falling short and the government is not
fulfilling its obligations. The 2011 revision of the IASC Operational Guidelines
provides that, “often, negative impacts on
the human rights concerns after a natural disaster do not arise from purposeful
policies but are the result of inadequate
planning and disaster preparedness, inappropriate policies and measures to respond
to the disasters, or simple neglect.” While
the political and economic realities facing
Haiti may render the government unable
to protect human rights as it should, it is
an important lesson that protecting human
rights before a disaster is the best remedy
to ensure them after one.

New National Defense Authorization
Act Authorizes Indefinite Detention
of U.S. Citizens
On October 26, 2001 President Bush
enacted the Patriot Act authorizing indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens, allowing
suspected terrorists to be detained without
trial until the War on Terrorism ended. On
January 11, 2002, the first group of twenty
detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay’s
Camp X-Ray, where they were housed
in open-air cages with concrete floors.
Later that month, President Bush declared
detainees’ status as unlawful enemy combatants, which disqualified them from
prisoner-of-war protection under Article
Five of the Geneva conventions (though
protections are still afforded under Article
Three). Human rights advocates argue that
this system of indefinite detention circumvents the rule of law, and fails to
prosecute terrorist suspects efficaciously,
while wrongfully detaining hundreds. Yet
on the eve of the ten-year anniversary of
the first detainees arriving at Guantanamo
Bay, President Obama signed the indefinite detention of alleged terrorists into law,
despite his previously voiced reservations.
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On December 31, 2011, President
Obama signed the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), or H.R. 1540,
for the 2012 fiscal year. Congress passes
this act annually to monitor the budget for
the Department of Defense, but this year
the bill included highly controversial new
provisions that allow indefinite military
detention of U.S. citizen terrorist suspects,
and requires the detention of suspected
foreign enemies. The provisions also apply
to any person who supports or aids “belligerent” acts against the United States,
whether the person is apprehended abroad
or on domestic soil.
U.S. citizens may now be joining the
171 detainees who remain at Guantánamo
Bay, most of whom have never been
charged with a crime and do not know
when they will face trial, if at all. Many
of the detainees were subjected to forced
disappearances in secret CIA custody prior
to being brought to Guantánamo, as well
as to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment; held incommunicado in solitary confinement for extended
periods. Exactly what “interrogation techniques” have been used and what conditions the detainees were subjected to in
CIA custody remains classified.
The Obama administration maintains
that the law is merely a codification of
existing standards and that U.S. citizens
are exempt. While U.S. citizens are in fact
exempted from the mandatory detention
requirement of section 1032 of the new
law, section 1031 offers no exemption for
American citizens from the discretionary
authorization of the U.S. Government to
indefinitely detain them without charge
or trial. Though supporters and critics disagree on whether the new law is a positive
step, they agree that it will mean much
more than maintaining the status quo.
Instead, the law enshrines military authority
to detain and imprison civilians anywhere
in the world, without formal charges or
trial. The power to detain is so broad that
U.S. citizens may now be taken by the
military from any “battlefield.” In support of the bill, Senator Lindsey Graham
explained that it will “basically say in law
for the first time that the homeland is part
of the battlefield” and that people can be
imprisoned without charge or trial whether
American citizens or not. Senator Graham
elaborated that if a U.S. citizen is “thinking
about helping al-Qaeda,” then they are an

“enemy combatant” and are not entitled to
legal representation.

as drug rehabilitation centers throughout
the country.

For the past ten years, the indefinite
detention system created by the Patriot
Act has created a tenuous human rights
situation for foreign nationals. The NDAA
now extends the danger of human rights
violations to U.S. citizens, and in the process violates their constitutional rights.
The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution grants citizens liberty
from unreasonable seizures of their person,
while the Fifth Amendment guarantees
that one cannot be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.
The Sixth amendment provides every U.S.
citizen the right to a fair trial in front of a
jury with the assistance of counsel. The
NDAA provisions openly violate these
constitutional rights and perpetuate the
use of the facilities at Guantanamo Bay,
now open to the U.S. citizens they purported to protect. President Obama issued
a statement saying “I want to clarify that
my Administration will not authorize the
indefinite military detention without trial
of American citizens . . . doing so would
break with our most important traditions
and values as a Nation.” Unfortunately, a
presidential statement alone is not binding
on future administrations’ interpretation
of the NDAA. What will be left when
the Obama Administration is gone is a
law that authorizes human rights abuses
and constitutional violations in the country
and worldwide.

Despite the aims of these clinics, lesbian,
gay, bi-sexual, transgender, and inter-sex
(LGBTI) individuals in Ecuador actually
enjoy more profound de jure recognition
of their rights than do their counterparts
in other countries in Latin America. For
example, Ecuador was the first country in
the Americas, and the third in the world, to
include sexual orientation as a protected
category in its Constitution in 1998. In
1997, the country’s Constitutional Tribunal
overturned section one of Article 516 of
the Penal Code, which criminalized sexual
activities between persons of the same
sex. Article 68 of the 2008 Constitution
formally recognized same-sex civil unions
under the law, and Article 11 reiterated
the freedom of all peoples from discrimination. Article 66 also guaranteed all
Ecuadorians the rights to physical, moral,
and sexual integrity of person, as well as
freedom of expression of sexual orientation. Finally, Article 212 of the Penal Code
criminalizing hate speech, sanctions those
who incite hate against any other person
for reason of their sex, sexual orientation, or sexual identification, among other
characteristics.

Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers North America for the
Human Rights Brief.

Latin America
Shutting Down Clinics that
‘Cure Homosexuality’ in Ecuador
In January 2012, three Ecuadorian
non-governmental organizations posted
a petition on Change.org, asking the
Ecuadorian Ministry of Health to close
“ex-gay” clinics. The petition received
over 100,000 signatures, sending a strong
message to the Ecuadorian government
from the international community. Until
January, lesbians in Ecuador were being
tortured and sexually abused in approximately two hundred clinics that claimed
they could “cure” people of their homosexuality. The clinics generally masqueraded
39

However, the de facto situation of
LGBTI rights and protections against
discrimination and even violence is completely contradictory to the law. These
“intense rehabilitation” clinics employed
methods prohibited under the United
Nations Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment and the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture. Ecuador is a state-party to
both of these conventions, and to the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication
of Violence against Women — conventions
whose principles are violated by abuses
which were taking place at these clinics.
Twenty-four year-old Paola Ziritti came
forward after being held against her will
in a clinic for two years, and reported that
the clinic staff would routinely sexually
and physically assault her. She spent several months handcuffed and was regularly
doused with urine and water. Other women
have reported being raped or threatened
with rape, handcuffed, deprived of food
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and water, and forced to dress like prostitutes, according to Tatiana Velasquez, a
representative of Taller de Comunicación
Mujer, one of the organizations that petitioned the Ministry of Health to shut
down the clinics. Taller de Comunicación
Mujer, along with Fundación Causana
and Artikulación Esporádika, have worked
with clinic victims since at least 2005.
However, information about the situation
of the LGBTI community in Ecuador is
difficult to find, as homosexuality is still
taboo in Ecuadorian society and is rarely
discussed. Despite efforts by the LGBTI
community to assert itself, as evidenced
most recently by the July 2011 pride
parades in Quito and Guayaquil, the country’s two largest cities, the relative strength
of the Catholic Church, as well as the
machismo which permeates the culture,
may be barriers to successfully lobbying
for the closure of these clinics. During the
2008 constitutional referendum, conservative Catholic clergy and evangelical church
leaders allied themselves with the “No”
vote in protest over the legalization of
same-sex civil unions. Furthermore, apart
from the religious belief that homosexuality is a moral wrong, many people believe
that homosexuality is also a curable disease, as evidenced by the prevalence of
these torture clinics.
Regardless of outside influences and
prevailing societal beliefs about homosexuality in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian
Government has a legal obligation to
continue to close these clinics. Whether
Ecuadorian or international bodies take
action, the practices these clinics employed
are illegal and a violation of the rights of
the women who were trapped in them.

Colombia Takes a Step toward
Justice with its Victims Law
Colombia is continuing its work toward
lasting peace by addressing the needs
of the victims of the country’s decadeslong armed conflict. On June 10, 2011,
President Juan Manuel Santos signed
the Victims and Land Restitution Law
(Victims Law), which complies with the
United Nations’ Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations
of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles) of
2005. The goal of the Victims Law is to

require the return of land appropriated
by armed groups to its rightful inhabitants, and to financially compensate the 3.7
million internally-displaced persons (IDPs)
and other victims of violence since 1985.
Santos’ government chose 1985 as the earliest date to which people could cite claims
because of that year’s symbolic importance
in the country’s history — on November 6,
1985, members of the now-defunct M-19
guerilla group stormed the Palace of Justice
in Bogotá. The event ended in the death of
eleven of the twenty-five Supreme Court
Justices, all thirty-five participating M-19
members, and nearly fifty army soldiers.
The Victims Law was generally
greeted with support and enthusiasm by
the Colombian and international communities, as evidenced by UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon’s presence at the
signing ceremony. In accordance with the
Basic Principles, the Victims Law strictly
defines victims as unarmed civilians who
suffered violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law during the
armed conflict. If the victim is deceased,
immediate family members may make a
claim on behalf of the victim. No armed
combatants can apply to the victims’ fund
for compensation, except for former child
soldiers. The law also outlines the general
principles that will guide the restitution
process, including dignity, equality, good
faith, and due process. Article 28 of the
law details a list of victims’ rights during
the restitution process, including, among
others, the right to truth and justice, family
reunification, and lives free of violence.
The Victims Law also complies with the
Basic Principles by describing the process
victims must go through in order to make
their restitution claims, and the social
services available to victims during and
after this process. The Basic Principles
provide for access to justice and reparations for harm suffered. In recognition of
the fact that giving detailed accounts of
the violence victims experienced would be
emotionally taxing, the Colombian government will provide counseling services for
those who file restitution claims. Special
consideration is given to IDPs and vulnerable populations like the indigenous and
Afro-Colombians, as well as human rights
defenders and union organizers. Finally,
the law includes specific measures for land
resettlement, which are presented in more
detail in the corresponding regulations.
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President Santos signed these regulations on December 20, 2011. They were
drafted in response to questions about
how the reparations provisions would
actually be enforced, and they establish
more detailed assistance measures for the
victims. The three main components of
the regulations are restitution payments to
victims (up to US $11,900 each, over
the next ten years), administrative procedures to enroll in the victims’ fund, and
safeguards for vulnerable populations to
prevent gross human rights violations in
the future. The amount of each restitution
payment will be determined partly by the
severity of the violence suffered by the
victim during the civil war, but also by
the types of positive steps the victim or
the victim’s family has taken since then to
rebuild his or her life. For example, higher
payments will be given to those who have
already invested in their education or that
of their children, or who promise to do so
in the future. This provision is in keeping
with the Basic Principles as well.
A special office has been created
to assist IDPs in establishing their land
claims. Civil society organizations in
Colombia have reported that citizens were
not only forced to flee because of the
violence, but were also forcibly evicted
from their land in many cases. This land
was then cultivated to finance the armed
conflict. President Santos hopes to return
over five million acres of land to displaced
persons in the next few years. Concerns
remain, however, about the possibility of
renewed violence against victims returning
to their land — since Santos took office
in August 2010, over twenty leaders of
farmers attempting to reclaim stolen land
have been murdered and only six people
have been arrested in these killings to
date. Despite explicit warnings by the
Colombian government that such violent
acts will no longer be tolerated, no changes
have been made to the penal code and the
Victims Law does not directly address this
new violence. Therefore, only time will tell
if the Victims Law can truly provide the
justice it promises.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers Latin America for
the Human Rights Brief.
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Middle East and North Africa
Page Not Found: The Tunisian
Internet Agency’s Appeal to
Eliminate Censorship
On August 15, 2011, a Tunisian appellate
court upheld a May 2011 order requiring
the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to censor
Internet access for all Tunisians. The ATI
intends to appeal the decision to the Tunisian
Court of Cassation, the country’s highest
court. Under new leadership after the
January 2011 revolution, the ATI opened
Tunisia up to the Internet fully for the
first time in the country’s history. The
ATI is using the resources at its disposal
to advocate for freedom of expression via
the Internet and against Internet censorship. The Agency encountered resistance
on two fronts: from the Tunisian courts,
which ordered the ATI to block all pornographic material, and from the Tunisian
military, which ordered the agency to censor certain politically objectionable sites
and Facebook pages. If the ATI loses its
pending appeal, the agency will, pursuant
to judicial order, block a classified list of
websites deemed morally objectionable
that the government can update at will.
The creation and enforcement of such a
censorship list would violate Article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Judicial censorship of the Internet in Tunisia combined
with the political agenda advanced by the
military would together represent a de
facto state of censorship not much different from the one present under the regime
of ousted former President Ben Ali.
Under the Ben Ali regime, the ATI
blocked culturally and politically objectionable content using censorship software
installed at the Internet’s point-of-entry
into the country. The newly elected legislature is facing pressure from progressive
groups in the country to repeal old statutes
that remain in force, including laws that
proscribe jail time for nonviolent speech
and structural modifications that effectively give the executive branch total control over the nomination, promotion and
discipline of judges.
Article 19 of the ICCPR, to which
Tunisia is a party, provides that “Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,

either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.” (emphasis added). According
to General Comment 34, which describes
the UN Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 19, parties to the
ICCPR must protect Internet-based forums
and “take all necessary steps to foster the
independence of these new media and to
ensure access of individuals thereto.”
The planned censorship list put forth
by the Tunisian court contravenes both the
letter of the treaty and its interpretation
by the Committee. General Comment 34
reads Article 19 to include all information
including “political discourse, commentary on one’s own or public affairs,” even
if it is “deeply offensive.” The military
is a legitimate arm of the government
and often a political force itself, and the
order to censor anti-military statements
on Facebook seems to fall squarely within
the definition of permissible political
discourse under Article 19. Additionally,
the censorship of pornographic materials
may contravene the prohibition against
censoring even “deeply offensive” material,
although in practice more conservative interpretations may find certain pornography
to be a form of gender discrimination and
therefore subject to restriction to prevent
public morals. Even under such a reading,
the General Comment makes clear that
removing all individual choice and giving the
government total control over the regulation
of pornography would constitute “unfettered
discretion” in violation of Article 19.
The classified list of censored materials
proposed under the court order is a troubling and immeasurable step backwards
for the free society that the new government endeavors to build. Tunisia experienced its first free election on October
23, 2011, and the inability for its citizens
to discuss future government formations
and political issues using the Internet as
a forum runs counter to both the goal of
building a new democratically engaged
nation and Tunisia’s treaty obligations
under the ICCPR not to confer “unfettered discretion” to limit freedoms using
national laws.

Saleh’s Amnesty: Providing Peace
or Preventing Remedy?
On January 21, 2012, the Yemeni parliament passed a law granting President
Ali Saleh immunity for all “politically
41

motivated” crimes against the people of
Yemen. This statement of immunity formed
the substantive part of a Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) brokered deal between
Saleh and the new Yemeni parliament.
The International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) requires signatory
states to ensure that victims of violations of
the ICCPR, such as those allegedly committed by Saleh during the recent Yemeni
revolutions, have access to an effective
remedy. The parliament’s decision to neutralize Yemeni citizens’ ability to prosecute
President Saleh in exchange for his voluntary
abdication of power represents a violation of
Yemen’s obligations to provide an effective
remedy for violations of the ICCPR.
As part of the January agreement, Saleh
ended his career as President and transferred power to Vice President Abd-Rabbu
Hadi. Hadi went on to run unopposed in
the February 2012 election, winning 99%
of a vote in which barely 64% of the citizenry participated. The new immunity law
protects Saleh and his aides from prosecution for their role in widespread violence
against civilians peacefully protesting the
government since February 2011, resulting
in the death of around 2,000 civilians and
military defectors. Protesters calling for
constitutional and governmental reform
suffered from armed attacks, arbitrary
arrests, torture, and forced disappearances.
The immunity also extends to public prosecution of crimes committed by Saleh and
his aides over the course of his 33-year
rule, including the government’s controversial use of artillery against the Huthis
in Northern Yemen during the period of
unrest Yemen experienced between 2004
and 2010. While lauded as an efficient
way to put a prompt end to the bloodshed,
the immunity deal garnered widespread
Western and GCC support due to concerns
that al-Qaeda, which enjoys a strong presence in Yemen, might be strengthened by
continued unrest.
The new immunity law violates Yemen’s
international legal responsibilities under
the ICCPR, to which Yemen is a party.
Article 2 of the ICCPR states that “[e]ach
State Party undertakes . . . to ensure that
any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” Thus,
the ICCPR guarantees an effective remedy
to any citizen whose rights have been
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violated, regardless of whether the perpetrator was acting in his official capacity. Despite the political considerations
in Yemen, General Comment 31 of the
Human Rights Committee, which informs
analysis of states’ obligations under Article
2, notes that “[t]he requirement under
article 2, paragraph 2, to take steps to give
effect to the Covenant rights is unqualified
and of immediate effect. A failure to comply with this obligation cannot be justified
by reference to political, social, cultural or
economic considerations within the State.”

legislative chamber. Given the present state
of internal Yemeni politics making domestic change unlikely, a diametric shift at the
highest level of parliament as the issuing
body is necessary to ensure compliance
with Yemen’s international obligations. If
legislation like this immunity law is used to
parlay citizens’ internationally guaranteed
right to redress in exchange for political
stability, the weight of international legal
commitments would be insignificant in the
minds of policymakers and national entities responsible for enforcement.

Amnesty can be a powerful conflict
resolution tool, but guidelines published by
the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) prohibit broad,
blanket grants of amnesty that infringe on
essential human rights by preventing prosecution of those who “may be responsible”
for crimes against humanity. The reintegration of combatants back into society, both
judicially and socially, is a common obstacle to national repair following intrastate
conflict, and immunity from prosecution is
a customary way to begin reconciliation as
discussed by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). This comes with
the explicit exception that such amnesty
should not be used to allow those with
command authority and suspected of war
crimes to evade punishment.

Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Middle East and North
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

The new immunity law signed by
President Saleh contravenes both the letter and spirit of the ICCPR, and a fundamental misuse of amnesty as a remedy
for any government-sponsored prosecution
for crimes committed against the people
of Yemen. Without making a judgment
as to President Saleh’s guilt or innocence
by preventing the requisite investigation,
the Yemeni parliament has acted inconsistently with international law. The General
Comment notes that failure to investigate
violations of the aforementioned rights,
implicitly folded into the government’s
blanket grant of criminal immunity, may
constitute a separate breach of the ICCPR.
Internal politics within Yemen make it
unclear as to whether conventional political channels of overturning a policy like
this one would even be possible. The
Supreme Court is effectively controlled
by the Executive branch, and one chamber
of the bicameral legislature — the Sura
Council — is entirely appointed by the
President. The President’s majority party
controls 238 of the 301 seats in the other

Sub-Saharan Africa
Labor Abuses in Zambia’s
Copperbelt
Zambia, known for its mineral wealth and
currently Africa’s largest copper producer,
has attracted significant Chinese investment since 1990. While these investments
have created jobs and increased copper
production, human rights groups decry
the copper mines’ poor labor conditions
that have existed since these investments
began. A recent Human Rights Watch
(HRW) report examines the labor practices
of Chinese state-owned copper mines, and
calls on the Zambian and Chinese governments to take measures to enforce labor
laws and conform to international labor
standards. Advocacy organizations like
HRW hope that shedding light on these
violations will ensure that further economic development of Zambia does not
jeopardize the safety of its workers.
Observed labor violations in the
Chinese-owned mines include low wages,
long hours, a lack of safety standards,
and undercutting of mining unions. While
dangers are inherent to copper mining,
Zambian government representatives admit
that safety conditions in Chinese-owned
copper mines are very poor. For example,
in 2005, mine explosions killed forty-six
Zambian workers, many of whom were
initially unidentified because the mine
operators did not keep employee records.
Contrary to copper mining and processing
standards throughout Zambia, the Chineseowned mines often require twelve-hour
shifts instead of the eight-hour shifts
outlined in Zambian mining standards.
42

The HRW report details safety and health
hazards resulting from toxins and dust
inhalation, as well as the lack of proper
attire and equipment to prevent these hazards. Notably, HRW points out that the poor
safety standards in Zambia’s Chinese-run
mines resemble the labor abuses occurring
in mines in China.
Zambia’s Mines Safety Department is
responsible for enforcing the country’s
mining regulations. However, human
rights groups report that the department
is ineffective, failing to enforce both
domestic and international labor law in
the Chinese-owned copper mines. While
regulation of all Zambian mines is subpar, human rights group emphasize that
the Chinese-owned mines are some of
the worst in the country. International
Labor Organization Convention No. 176
concerning Safety and Health in Mines
sets out basic mine safety standards that
states and employers must follow. Not
only do Chinese employers fail to comply
with these standards, but they also tend to
discriminate against employees for affiliation with non-Chinese labor unions even
though freedom of association is protected under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Domestically, mine safety
and freedom of association are outlined
within the Zambian Industrial and Labour
Relations Act 269 and the Minimum Wages
and Conditions of Employment Act 267.
HRW has called on the Chinese
government to convene the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation to establish
mechanisms addressing labor conditions
and compliance with international human
rights standards in foreign investments.
HRW also recommends that the Zambian
government improve the functionality of
the Mines Safety Department, and also
investigate and prosecute mining company
officials who intimidate miners into working in hazardous areas.
In response to the HRW report, the
Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Mining
Corporation (CNM), which operates four
copper mines in Zambia, said that “language and cultural differences” could have
resulted in “misunderstandings.” Since the
report’s release, however, CNM has promised to conduct a general investigation, and
also to rectify existing malpractices. Yet
human rights groups continue to emphasize
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the need for involvement of the Zambian
government if labor conditions and standards
are to improve.
Human rights abuses associated with
Chinese involvement in Africa are not
limited to Zambia. Recently, China has
sold arms to the Sudanese government,
some of which have been used to remove
indigenous southerners from their lands
to provide for Chinese development of
oil fields. Additionally, the government
of Zimbabwe has become heavily reliant
on Chinese lending and investment in
exchange for natural resources; human
rights advocates note with frustration
the detrimental social impact of growing
Chinese alliance with Zimbabwe, allowing
Zimbabwe to continue practices contrary
to international norms and pressure.
The consequences of China’s increased
involvement in Africa remain the subject of
much debate among human rights groups.
While China’s willingness to build roads
in Gabon, develop mines in Zambia, and
buy oil in Sudan has allowed for increased
economic development, human rights
advocates continue to address the lack
of respect for human rights. As Zambia’s
mining industry grows, advocates will
continue to make the case that sacrificing
domestic and international labor standards,
along with other human rights, is too big a
price to pay to attract foreign investment.

Abuse of Somali Refugees in Kenya
and Ethiopia
Since 2010, escalating conflict in southern Somalia between forces allied with the
Somali Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and the Islamist armed group
al-Shabaab has resulted in thousands of
civilian casualties and numerous human
rights abuses against the refugee population. Human rights groups continue to
encourage the TFG, the United Nations
(UN), the African Union (AU), the
Kenyan and Ethiopian Governments, and
the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to take steps to ensure that
all parties are trained on international
humanitarian law standards and how to
respond to the increasingly frequent abuses
committed against refugees.
The current conflict between the TFG
and Al-Shabaab began in 2006 when the
TFG, Ethiopian troops, and other military
allies defeated the Islamist Courts Union
(ICU), which was a rival administration to

the TFG based on Sharia law. Al-Shabaab
formed shortly after this defeat as a TFG
off-shoot and has been causing havoc ever
since. Recently, the number of uprooted
and displaced Somalis has increased
dramatically due to regional instability,
and extreme drought and famine. Somali
civilians continue to flee drought and conflict-affected areas to seek assistance across
the border, but have faced repeated and
unlawful deportation back to their war-torn
country despite obligations under the 1951
Refugee Convention to allow safe haven to
asylum seekers escaping violence.
The severe drought, combined with
the armed conflict, have led the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees to deem the
situation in Somalia “the worst humanitarian
crisis in the world today.” In 2010, the Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees
reported that nearly 1.46 million civilians
had been displaced, including 614,000 forced
to flee to neighboring countries. Since this
crisis declaration, human rights groups have
been calling for international relief efforts.
Additionally, these groups have criticized
Kenyan and Ethiopian forces for violating
international humanitarian law standards by
returning refugees to conflict areas.
Human rights groups have reported
numerous other human rights violations
perpetrated against Somali refugees in
addition to forced return, including arrest,
deportation, and abuses by military forces
and police. For example, in violation of
Kenya’s Refugee Act of 2006, Kenyan
police regularly arrest without cause
and extort money from Somali refugees.
Furthermore, overcrowding and a continued influx of asylum seekers have led
to poor living conditions in the refugee
camps. The Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya
is currently the largest refugee camp in the
world, sheltering around 450,000 refugees
though it was built to hold only 30,000.
As a result of camp congestion, vulnerable
groups such as women and unaccompanied children experience little protection.
Human rights groups have also received
reports of Kenyan police raping Somali
refugees and not being held accountable
even when the information comes to light.
Similar to the refugee situation in
Kenya, Somali refugees in Ethiopia face
instability and abuse. When Somali women
and girls travel to and arrive at refugee
camps in Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, they experience an increased risk of gender-based
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violence, including rape, violence, and
forced marriage. A lack of permanent
security measures and preventive efforts
such as adequate lighting at transit centers has impeded efforts to alleviate these
human rights violations.
In light of these crises, human rights
advocates emphasize the importance of
TFG’s collaboration with the international community, as outlined in the 2011
Kampala Accord, to assist the transitional
government in holding accountable those
responsible for humanitarian law violations. International humanitarian law, also
known as the law of war, is defined in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which
seek to limit the effects of armed conflict
on civilians and to restrict the methods
of warfare. These norms are intended to
protect wounded members of the armed
forces, prisoners of war, and refugees in
conflict areas.
One critical component of international
humanitarian law is the 1951 Refugee
Convention, which requires conflicting
parties to follow the principles of nondiscrimination and non-penalization of
civilian conflict victims. The Convention
also contains non-refoulement provisions
that prohibit the forced return of refugees
facing persecution or violence in their
countries of origin, which Ethiopia and
Kenya have violated by refusing safe haven
to Somali refugees.
As abuses against Somali refugees
are increasingly exposed, the international community continues to call on the
Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian governments to respect humanitarian law. Human
rights activists insist that hosts of Somali
refugees end their unlawful return and
alleviate overcrowding of refugee camps.
Without timely investigation and prosecution of international humanitarian law
violations being perpetrated within and
outside Somalia, however, measures to
improve refugee conditions will prove
insufficient to address the humanitarian
crisis confronting the Somali people.
Saralyn Salisbury, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers Sub-Saharan Africa
for the Human Rights Brief.
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Europe
The Case of N.Ç.: A Turkish
Child’s Presumed Consent to
Prostitution
In many countries, when a thirteenyear-old girl is sold as a child prostitute,
courts presume the girl has been raped.
The Supreme Court of Appeals in Turkey
recently found otherwise. Two women, who
purported to be thirteen-year-old N.Ç.’s
employers at a local factory in the province
of Mardin, sold her as a child prostitute to
over twenty-six men for a period of seven
months. Both women have been sentenced
to nine years in prison, but the twenty-six
men, including teachers, civil servants,
and village elders, have received reduced
sentences ranging from one to six years.
The men benefited from a legal technicality, namely the old Turkish penal code
that was in effect at the time of the rapes
included a provision allowing reduced
sentences in cases where the minor
consented to the sexual activity. The lowest
court applied the old code, ruled that the
girl consented to the intercourse, and sentenced each of the men to a minimum of
five years in prison for statutory rape. The
court also agreed to lower the sentences
of some defendants by between two and
ten months based on good behavior during
the trial. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court
upheld the lower court’s ruling, and an
official of the Court defended its application of the old code as an “undebatable rule
of law.” The reduced sentences for these
perpetrators are alarmingly indicative of
the state of children’s rights in Turkey.
The new code leaves no room for consideration of consent by a minor to sexual
intercourse (the age for sexual consent in
Turkey is fifteen). As such, the new law
seems to be a legal victory for children’s
rights. However, the alarming fact of N.Ç.’s
case is not that the courts applied the old
penal code. Courts are often precluded
from retroactively applying new laws. The
alarming fact of N.Ç.’s case is that all of
the judges on Turkey’s Supreme Court
ruled that N.Ç. consented to sexual intercourse with at least twenty-six men. In
other words, the Supreme Court ruled that
a thirteen-year-old girl had the capacity
to consent to child prostitution. If a child
can legally consent to prostitution, then
child prostitution in itself is not a violation
of that child’s human rights unless it is
against the child’s will. If a court is willing

to rule that a thirteen-year-old girl such as
N.Ç. engaged in the intercourse willingly,
then what child-victim of sexual violence
stands a chance of obtaining justice in
Turkey? Because the Supreme Court is
Turkey’s highest court, N.Ç.’s only alternative for recourse is through an international
court of human rights.
International human rights law does
not permit the assumption of consent by
a minor to prostitution. Article 34 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
requires that all State Parties undertake to
protect children from all forms of sexual
exploitation and abuse by taking appropriate national, bilateral, and multilateral
measures to prevent child prostitution.
Article 3 of the Optional Protocol to
the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child requires that all participating State
Parties make sexual exploitation of a child
a criminal offense, and take measures to
establish the liability of legal persons for
committing an offense of child prostitution. Neither document mentions or allows
consent by a child to rape or prostitution.
Turkey ratified both the Convention and
the Optional Protocol in 1995 and 2002
respectively.
The conventions imply that there is no
basis in international human rights law for
the assumption of consent by a minor to
acts of sexual violence, and many people
in Turkey seem to agree. Human rights
activists protested the Supreme Court’s
ruling outside the Palace of Justice in
Istanbul on Friday, November 4, 2011.
The Family and Social Policies Minister
of Turkey, Fatma Şahin, called the sentence “unacceptable and worrying;” the
President of Turkey himself, Abdullah Gul,
said the Supreme Court’s ruling made
him “deeply uncomfortable;” and Umit
Kocasakal, head of Istanbul’s bar association, said the Supreme Court’s decision
was “bloodcurdling.” But Supreme Court
officials simply stated that “this decision is
not definite, it is also not possible for this
decision to be changed by making noise.”
Regardless of the reason for the
Supreme Court’s decision, N.Ç.’s case illuminates the reality that the achievement
of human rights principles must come
through the law, at the hands of those who
administer it. Without the support of a
society’s judicial authorities, victims of
human rights violations have grim prospects for justice and restitution.
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Election Fraud Protests in Russia
Briefly in January and February 2012,
it appeared the Russian government had
decidedly altered its public policy against
opposition protests and public demonstrations. The Russian government allowed
two successful, peaceful demonstrations to
occur on December 10 and December 24,
2011, and a third, much later, on February
26, 2012. Human rights organizations and
activists looked hopeful and remarked on
possible explanations for the policy shift.
But the government’s arrest of nearly 550
people at election fraud demonstrations on
March 5, 2012 has refuted these hopes.
The Russian government has ratified
several legal documents that protect the
right of its citizens to protest publicly.
Russian Constitution Article 31 states that
Russian citizens “shall have the right to
gather peacefully, without weapons, and
to hold meetings, rallies, demonstrations,
marches, and pickets.” In customary international law, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) Article 20 provides
for freedom of peaceful assembly and association and Article 19 provides for freedom
of opinion and expression. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) Article 21 requires states to recognize the right of peaceful assembly and
provides that “no restrictions . . . be placed
on the exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order, the protection of
public health or morals or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.” In practice, this provision enables governments to
require protesters to obtain permits prior to
holding public demonstrations.
Though not required specifically by
its Constitution, the Russian government
requires citizens to obtain a written permit
from local authorities, such as the local
Mayor’s office, before protesting publicly.
Applicants must indicate the location and
estimated number of participants, and may
be subject to a nominal fine if their estimates turn out inaccurately low. If Russian
authorities meet resistance when attempting
to disperse demonstrators, resisting protesters may be detained for up to 15 days.
Prior to the March 5 arrests, some
commentators theorized that the change
in Russia’s response to public protests
could conceivably be explained by the
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permit requirement. Previous protests that
ended in mass arrests either did not have
a permit at all, or had displayed gross
inconsistencies between the number of
individuals estimated to participate and
those who actually attended, with the latter exceeding the former by thousands in
some cases. Conversely, both December
demonstrations were sanctioned by the
Russian authorities after demonstrators
obtained the required permits, and were
carried out peacefully, with no violence
occurring between police and demonstrators. The permit requirement theory may
also explain the March 5 arrests, as many
of those arrested had refused to leave their
demonstration sites even after their protest
permits had expired at 9 p.m.
While protestors’ failures to satisfy permit requirements may explain the government’s varied responses to demonstrations, other commentators theorized that
December’s peaceful protests should be
attributed to something less tangible — the
political considerations required by the new
and middle-class demographic participating in those protests. Vladislav Y. Surkov, a
Kremlin official who previously protected
Mr. Putin from potentially politically dangerous street rallies, stated the protestors
on December 10 represented “the best part
of our society, or, more accurately, the most
productive part.” Yevgeny S. Gontmakher, a
government economic advisor, commented
on the remarkability of the protestors’
demands for political rights rather than
economic relief, stating this fact “is a sign
that Russia is becoming a Western country,
in its own way.”
Now following the March 5 arrests,
another theory must be posited: perhaps
the seeming, now probably temporary,
policy shift had nothing to do with permit
requirements or protest demographics.
Perhaps instead it was simply and entirely
political. In Russia, political protests are
renowned for producing violence, but not
change. Perhaps permitting the protests
to occur peacefully was only Vladimir
Putin’s bone to the people to appease them
after allegedly rigged parliamentary elections in December but before his expected
presidential election on March 4. If so,
one might argue it was quite an effective
distraction. No notable protests occurred
between December 24 and February 26,
and Human Rights Watch, which monitored the protests, continued to write that
the protests occurred peacefully.

Regardless, Vladimir Putin is Russia’s
President yet again, and opposition protesters are being arrested in droves. Perhaps the
next election season will provide renewed
hope for the respect of the people’s right
to peaceful assembly — but then again, a
cynic would say, that seems rather unlikely.
Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Europe for the Human
Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Tajikistan’s Parental
Responsibility Law: Preventing
Extremism or Violating Rights?
On August 6, 2011, Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rahmon, signed the
Parental Responsibility Law into effect,
banning children under the age of eighteen
from attending religious services except
funerals. On August 31, police began stopping individuals under the age of eighteen
from entering mosques to celebrate Eid
al-Fitr. The law is exclusively enforced
against Muslims, who make up 90% of
Tajikistan’s population. According to
Suhaili Hodirou, a spokesperson for the
Tajik government’s Office of Human
Rights, “Religious activity is only banned
up to the age of 18 — beyond that they
have full rights.” The Tajik government
adopted the Parental Responsibility Law
in conjunction with an amendment to the
Criminal Code created to punish organizers
of “extremist religious” teaching to create
a safer environment for children who the
government says are vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. These provisions
violate the freedom of worship provided in
Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and, as
a party to the ICCPR, Tajikistan is bound to
protect the right to freedom of religion, the
right to peaceful assembly, and the right to
engage in cultural activities.
The new laws restricting religious
freedom come during a movement to
eliminate unsanctioned religious teaching,
which the government suggests leads to
violent extremism. The President introduced the new laws after the Tajikistan
Defense Minister released a report showing increased juvenile violent crime
rates in 2010. In August 2010, President
Rahmon made an announcement to Tajik
parents warning that their “children will
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become extremists and terrorists” if they
did not bring the approximately 2,000 students home from Islamic colleges abroad.
During 2011, government authorities shut
down mosques throughout Tajikistan’s capital, arrested individuals in their homes for
teaching unapproved schools of Muslim
thought, and forced religious groups to pay
for heavy censoring of literature.
Article 8 of the Parental Responsibility
Law states, “Parents are obliged…not to
let children-teenagers participate in the
activity of religious organizations.” The
only children exempt from this law are
those enrolled in state-sanctioned religious
schools. The Tajik government’s laws violate multiple articles in the ICCPR, most
notably Article 18. Article 18 provides
for freedom of “thought, conscience, and
religion” and is one of the ICCPR’s seven
non-derogable rights. Because the Article
18 rights are non-derogable, Tajikistan
cannot, except under very limited circumstances, infringe on these rights. Although
the Parental Responsibility Law does not
prevent individuals from self-identifying
as Muslim or from practicing Islam as an
adult, it does violate the Article 18 right
for any individual to “manifest his religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice,
and teaching.” Article 18 also requires that
countries “respect the liberty of parents…to
ensure the religious and moral education of
their children in conformity with their own
convictions.” The Parental Responsibility
Law prevents parents from exercising the
right to educate their children in accordance
with their religious beliefs.
Paragraph 3 of Article 18 allows exceptions to the freedom to worship when
restriction is necessary to protect the public
interest. However, General Comment 22
specifies that these restrictions should be
interpreted narrowly: limitations may never
derogate from Article 18’s “fundamental
character” but may restrain the freedom to
manifest religious beliefs if the restrictions
are necessary to protect other rights guaranteed in the ICCPR. Permissible limitations
must meet the specific purpose for which
the restriction is implemented, be directly
related and proportionate to the need it is
meant to fill, and may not be “applied in a
discriminatory manner.”
If, as President Rahmon says, the
Parental Responsibility Law is necessary
to prevent religious extremism and terrorism in Tajikistan, the restriction must
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be directly related and proportionate to
the possibility of individuals becoming
terrorists through religious practice in
Tajikistan. Because the Criminal Code
does not specify the meaning of “extremist religious” teaching and the new law
restricts most children from attending all
religious activities, the statute is neither
directly related nor proportionate. The
Parental Responsibility Law is also being
implemented in a discriminatory manner
because, thus far, it has only been enforced
against Muslims. The right to freedom
of religion is non-derogable under the
ICCPR, and the Parental Responsibility
Law does not meet the Comment’s stringent test to allow for limitation on the
manifestation of religious practice.

Exchanging Reproductive Justice
for a Food Processor: Incentivized
Sterilization in Rajasthan, India
In the summer of 2011, India’s National
Population Stabilization Fund (Fund)
instituted a new scheme in Jhunjhunu,
Rajasthan, a rural town west of New Delhi,
offering incentives for area residents who
agreed to undergo sterilization surgery.
Government health officials created a
sweepstakes program, entering those who
agree to be sterilized into a drawing to
win a TV, mini car, or food processor.
This scheme represents one of a pattern of
programs designed to help India meet its
Millennium Development Goal to reduce
its birth rate to two children per mother
by 2015. While the program does perform
some vasectomies, incentive programs
in rural communities disproportionately
affect women: according to the most recent
National Family Health Survey, 37 percent
of Indian women have been surgically
sterilized, and one percent of men have
had vasectomies. The use of incentivizing,
and often coercive, practices by government health officials compromise women’s
health by encouraging women to undergo
this dangerous procedure, often without
informed consent, proper health care, or
family planning information. By creating
programs that decrease women’s access
to quality health care and family planning information, India violations Articles
12, 14, and 16 of the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW).
Incentive-based sterilization programs
were popular with the Indian government from the 1950s until the mid-1970s

but disappeared after Indira Gandhi’s
19-month emergency suspension of the
Constitution ending in 1977. During this
time, Prime Minister Gandhi’s son, Sanjay,
implemented a policy of forcible sterilization in an attempt to curb the growing Indian population. When emergency
law was lifted, Sanjay’s program stopped,
and incentivized sterilization programs fell
out of favor. However, in recent years,
as India’s population reaches 1.2 billion,
the federal government’s Family Welfare
Program returned to the practice of incentivizing sterilization among men and
women in rural areas.
Unlike previous programs, the Rajasthan
scheme was the first to outsource surgeries to private clinics. In an attempt to meet
its goal of 30,000 sterilizations over a
period of three months, the Fund offered
private clinics about $308.00 per surgery
and an additional $10.00 per case if a single
clinic performed more than thirty operations a day. By offering such incentives to
the private sector, the Indian government
encourages clinics to “cut corners,” says
Abhijit Das of Health Watch Uttar Pradesh.
Utilizing the private sector also puts more
pressure on women to undergo the operation because clinics have no monetary
interest in obtaining informed consent, in
providing women with alternative contraceptive options, or in explaining the risks
associated with the procedure. Das says
sterilization is the number one contraceptive method offered in India and that one
quarter of people in a recent survey did not
even know about other options (37 percent
of Indian women have been sterilized, three
percent use the pill, and five percent use
condoms). Additionally, under incentivebased sterilization programs, women face
an increased risk of medical complications
because clinics do not provide the level of
care necessary to ensure proper health, and
women often decide to have children at a
younger age and get sterilized between the
ages of 22 and 23. At this age, women are
more vulnerable to gynecological problems
and are four times more likely to need a
hysterectomy later in life.
CEDAW’s Article 12 requires that state
parties eliminate health care discrimination
against women. The article specifically
provides for access to services, “including
those related to family planning.” Article
14 highlights the specific discrimination
rural women face, requiring States to
ensure that rural women have “access to
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adequate health care facilities, including
information, counseling, and services in
family planning.” Article 16 (1)(e) focuses
on the disparity of power between spouses,
requiring women to have equal rights to
choose the number and spacing of children
and to receive necessary information to
make informed family planning choices.
Incentive-based programs violate women’s access to information and adequate
health services by placing them in a position in which they are not empowered
to make informed family planning decisions. As currently implemented, the Fund’s
incentivized sterilization schemes greatly
limit women’s legally protected choice and
oppress, instead of promote, their equal
rights and advancement. Private individuals, who profit from women’s lack of information, are able to coerce women into getting the surgery before they have considered
other options. The provisions in Articles
12, 14, and 16 require India, as a party
to CEDAW, to take active steps to ensure
women are provided equal access to health
care services and adequate information,
regardless of where they live or how much
money they have. The first step toward
meeting this international obligation is to
provide comprehensive information about
different forms of contraceptives available,
the risks and benefits of each, and about
women’s protected right to choose the size
and spacing of their individual families.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers South and Central
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.

East, Southeast Asia & Oceania
Recent Legal Reforms in Burma
Give Hope for Lasting Democratic
Change
Since President Thein Sein assumed
power in March 2011, Burma’s nominally
civilian government has instituted a number of legal reforms drawing the attention
of the United Nations (UN) and many
Western democracies. Observing members of the international community are
considering whether these changes are
sufficiently genuine to warrant long-term
engagement with the Burmese government and the removal of sanctions against
the country. As evidence of commitment
to democratic advancement, they must
weigh the significance of changes made
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by executive and legislative decree over the
past six months against nearly 50 years of
authoritarian rule by military junta.
Burma’s most important legislative
action in the past six months has been
amending its Political Party Registration
law. In October 2011, Parliament removed
language that barred participation by parties that had not run in previous elections,
and by individuals with past convictions.
The law now allows opposition leader
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to represent her
National League for Democracy (NLD) in
April 2012 parliamentary elections. The
pro-democracy NLD is legally registered
and Suu Kyi is seeking a parliamentary
seat in the rural township of Kawhmu,
southwest of Rangoon. Both will reengage
in the political process despite Burma’s
military junta having refused to hand power
to NLD after its 1990 electoral victory.
The winner of the 48 contested parliamentary seats will nevertheless have limited
influence among the 498 total elected seats
in the upper and lower houses. The military
controls one-quarter of the bicameral legislature, and the President’s party occupies
80% of the remaining seats.
Burma’s first parliament in over
twenty-two years has passed additional
legal reforms. Late 2011 saw the passage of a Labor Organization Law and
Peaceful Assembly and Protection Bill.
The former allows workers to organize
unions and strike for the first time since
1962. The Assembly bill legalizes peaceful demonstrations after applying for permission from the government with five
days notice. After fifty years of military
rule before President Thein Sein, a retired
military official himself, skeptics question
the effects of these laws in practice. These
cautious observers also point to reports
of military abuse in Burma’s northern
Kachin state, despite a recent ceasefire
between the government and ethnic Karen
rebels, as evidence of reform in name only.
Furthermore, the government has yet to
release as many as 900 political prisoners.
Perhaps the best example of the tension between the government’s persistent authoritarian character in the face
of burgeoning democratic advancements
is Burma’s National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC). The NHRC was
created in September 2011 by Government
Notification No. 34/2011, which bypassed
legislative approval. The body is comprised

of fifteen members, including former military officials, bureaucrats, and academics. Few details are available about its
scope of responsibilities. According to an
announcement by the Commission, it was
founded to protect the rights of “citizens
described in the constitution.” This mandate may prove controversial, as Burma’s
2008 Constitution denies citizenship to
individuals whose parents are not Burmese
nationals. The NHRC’s first actions have
been to call for the release of all remaining
political prisoners and to visit internally
displaced persons in Kachin, though not
to investigate allegations of human rights
abuse by the military there.
A recent petition submitted to the NHRC
will test both the Commission’s mandate
and independence, key criteria under the
Paris Principles’ minimum competency
requirements for national human rights
institutions. In November 2011, nearly
thirty former doctors, lawyers, and students
signed a letter requesting reinstatement of
their access to education and practicing
licenses. Due to their previous detention as
political prisoners, lawyers such as Aung
Thein, former legal counsel to Aung San
Suu Kyi, have been banned from resuming
practice. Though only protecting limited
rights of citizens, the Burmese Constitution
nevertheless guarantees equal opportunity
to employment in provision 349, and a
fundamental right to education in provision
366. The petition is a potential bellwether
to determine how the retired civil servants
and scholars will approach allegations of
rights violations through newly created,
government-sanctioned channels.
On the 64th anniversary of its independence, Burma can also celebrate the
conclusion of a year that saw it win the
2014 chairmanship of ASEAN, a visit
from Secretary Hillary Clinton (the first
by a US Secretary of State in fifty years),
and commitments to discuss expansion of
humanitarian and other foreign aid from
the Japanese and British governments.
While the legitimacy of reforms remains to
be seen, Burma’s newest laws and NHRC
at least create increased space for activists
to take advantage of new rights and protect existing, fledgling rights. The NLD,
Suu Kyi, and other activists have shown
a willingness to continue to exploit even
politically motivated change. Whether the
President or military reneges on democratic progress, their political engagement
and the international attention it draws will
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nevertheless impact the demand for human
rights accountability in Burma.

Like, Comment, Share: Robust
Domestic and International Debate
on Thailand’s Lese Majeste Laws
Paving the Way for Reforms
In November 2011, the government
of Thailand convicted a 61-year-old man
for insulting the country’s monarchy in
four text messages. Under Thailand’s lèse
majesté law — one of the strictest in the
world — Ampon Tangnoppakul was sentenced to 20 years in prison, or five years
for each text. Tangnoppakul’s sentence
preceded two other highly publicized convictions in December. A Thai-US citizen
was sentenced to 30 months for translating
and posting online passages of a banned
biography of the King. A Red Shirt political activist was furthermore sentenced
to 15 years for speeches made in 2008.
Thailand has seen an increase from 33
lèse majesté cases in 2005 to 478 by 2010.
These three cases in particular have triggered international expressions of concern
and much domestic debate and activism
in a struggle for the future of freedom of
expression in Thailand in 2012.
The lèse majesté law is set forth in
Article 112 of Thailand’s Criminal Code,
which decrees that “whoever defames,
insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the
Heir to the throne or the Regent shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen
years.” Before 2006, Article 112 had been
used most frequently by political elites as
a proxy for targeting enemies with dissenting political views. Any citizen can bring a
lèse majesté complaint to police, and trials
are often closed to the public. Thailand has
been a party to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since
1996, Article 19 of which obligates the
country to protect the rights of individuals
who seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas of all kinds. Nevertheless, supporters of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy
deny the law’s harsh effect on freedom of
expression. Instead, they cite the need to protect the monarchy as an institution to justify
continued enforcement of Article 112.
Article 112 is often used in conjunction
with the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) of
2007 to block lèse majesté content. Under
this law, 117 judicial orders have blocked
75,000 Internet URL addresses in Thailand
since 2007. The CCA’s vague language
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targets Internet users, their online hosts,
or other intermediaries related to posting
data ostensibly threatening the “kingdom’s
security.” The combined effect of the two
laws is to expose a large number of Thais
to what some observers, such as Human
Rights Watch, criticize as politically motivated prosecutions encouraged by royalist
supporters. This hostile attitude toward
online intermediaries has led Thai authorities to warn Facebook users that sharing or
liking certain messages could expose them
to lèse majesté penalties. The Thai government has additionally asked Facebook to
remove 10,000 pages of what it perceives
to be royal insults.
Thailand underwent its Universal
Periodic Review in early October 2011,
when 14 member states recommended
amending or repealing Article 112. A few
days later, UN Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression Frank la Rue issued

a statement calling for amendments to
both Article 112 and the CCA. According
to the Special Rapporteur, the laws are
overly broad and impose harsh criminal sanctions. Such international pressure
was met domestically with a December
“Fearlessness Walk,” where lèse majesté
opponents stood silent for 112 minutes.
Reactions in support of Article 112 were
also seen in Bangkok in December, when
protesting Thai royalists defended the law
in front of the US embassy. In this way,
international attention has contributed to
vigorous debate of lèse majesté within
Thailand.
Despite criticism, the government’s
pursuit of convictions under Article 112
show a continuing resolve to politicize
Thailand’s monarchy. While Thailand’s
Facebook users contemplate the latest
lèse majesté convictions, Deputy Prime
Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung recently
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announced plans to spend $12.6m in technology to block online content critical of
the monarchy. In an effort to diffuse tensions, Thailand’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has announced its support
of reforms to Article 112. These changes
would give lighter sentences for convictions and better legal oversight of claims.
The announcement was publicized at the
same time that the National Human Rights
Commission formed a task force to review
the legality of lèse majesté enforcement.
The results of the Commission’s report
will be available in June 2012. Until then,
international pressure, domestic debate,
and investigations by impartial government institutions will continue to act as an
engine for change.
Thais-Lyn Trayer, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers East, Southeast Asia &
Oceania for the Human Rights Brief.

